Xi'an Incident

For the 1981 film based on the incident, see The Xi'an Incident (film).

Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng, and Chiang Kai-shek two months before the incident

Xi'an Incident
Traditional Chinese	西安事變
Simplified Chinese	西安事变
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Xī'ān Shìbiàn Wade–Giles Hsi-an Shih-pian

The Xi'an Incident was a major Chinese political crisis from 12 to 26 December 1936. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist government of China, was placed under house arrest in the city of Xi'an by a Nationalist army he was there to review. Chiang's captors hoped to end the Chinese Civil War and confront Japanese imperial expansion into Chinese territory. After two weeks of intense negotiations between Chiang, his captors, representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and significant external pressure from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, the two parties agreed to pursue a strategy of cooperation against future Japanese aggression.

Before the incident, Chiang Kai-shek had followed a public strategy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" that entailed eliminating the CCP before confronting Japanese aggression. This strategy was deeply unpopular among many groups in China, including the Northeastern Army tasked with suppressing the main Communist base in Yan'an. The Northeastern Army was mainly composed of troops exiled from Manchuria after that region was invaded by Japan in 1931. Northeastern Army soldiers and officers had also begun to fraternize with the Communists and were convinced of the need for a united Nationalist-Communist front against Japan.

Recent research has uncovered a new perspective surrounding the crisis. In the months leading up to the Xi'an Incident, Chiang had secretly initiated negotiations with both the CCP and the Soviet Union. In these secret dealings, the groundwork for the future United Front was laid in preparation for future Japanese aggression. These agreements were conducted through the summer and autumn of 1936, and finalized by early December, although not in writing.

Unaware of these developments, the commanders of the Northeastern Army, generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, hatched an independent conspiracy to kidnap Chiang. Zhang invited Chiang to come review the Northeastern Army, and after Chiang arrived, had him placed under house arrest at the Huaqing Pool complex.

Zhang Xueliang, Soong Mei-ling, and Chiang Kai-Shek in October, seven weeks before the incident

Some radical Communists, Mao Zedong chief among them, wanted Chiang executed immediately. However, overwhelming opposition from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin pressured the CCP against the move, as the Soviets valued Chiang's leadership as a critical asset against the Japanese threat to their eastern borders. In accordance with Moscow's instructions, the CCP aimed to pressure Chiang instead.

Zhou Enlai led the Communist negotiating team, which after two weeks finalized the secret agreement made earlier in the year. The rapprochement between the Communists and Nationalists outraged the Japanese, and eventually helped lead to the Second Sino-Japanese War. The full-scale Japanese invasion hastened the formal joining of the two Chinese factions in the Second United Front.

Background

Map showing the situation of China during the Xi'an Incident in December 1936

Political Situation

In the late 1930s, the Nationalist Chinese government faced a number of overlapping problems. Since Chiang Kai-shek had purged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1927, the Communists had led a widespread rural insurgency. The Nationalists found it difficult to organize an effective suppression campaign, in part because many of their armies answered to a local warlord rather than to the central government. The central government had to fight several wars during the early 1930s to keep these warlords in line. When the Empire of Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, the Nationalist government decided it was not ready to confront Japan directly and instead focused on consolidating their control of the country. This policy was known as "first internal pacification, then external resistance." Chiang launched on a series of encirclement campaigns against the CCP, which forced the Communists onto the Long March and almost destroyed the party. The survivors arrived in Yan'an on 15 October 1935, where they began to establish the Yan'an Soviet. They were besieged by a number of Nationalist armies, including the Northwestern Army under Yang Hucheng and the Northeastern Army under Zhang Xueliang.

Chiang's Policy

Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng in 1936

Despite the Nationalist's success against the Communists, the policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" faced strong public criticism. Leftists opposed the civil war against the Communists and right-wing nationalists desired greater resistance to Japan. Zhang Xueliang was one of the regime's critics. He had governed Manchuria before it was overrun by the Japanese, and strongly wished to retake his homeland. He opposed the concessions that Chiang made to Japan in the He–Umezu and Qin–Doihara Agreements. Chiang had slighted Zhang by refusing to let him resume his leadership of the Northeastern Army after a year-long absence. When Chiang did re-appoint Zhang to the post, he ordered him to focus on fighting the Communists rather than the Japanese.

In private, however, Chiang had begun preparations for war against Japan as early as 1932. In contrast to the views expressed in many post-war accounts, Chiang had long recognized the inevitability of war with Japan in China's journey for sovereignty. In March 1934, Chiang had informed a group of senior political leaders that "fewer than 1,100 days remained" before war with Japan (an estimate only off by 43 days). By summer of 1936, Chiang's window for finally defeating the Communists had closed, as he recognized the need for Soviet assistance to defend China. To this end, he would have to abandon any of destroying the final Communist holdouts, and begin negotiations.

Secret Negotiations and Zhang's Plot

In the summer of 1936, Chiang Kai-Shek opened private negotiations with both the Soviet Union and the CCP. The CCP, in accordance with the USSR's 1935 international policy against fascism, agreed with Stalin's demand for unification with the Nationalists. Chiang, in return, publicly announced that the Communists were nearly routed, and that he had no need to deal with them.

Zhou Enlai in the 1930s, who would represent the CCP at the negotiations

Meanwhile, the secret negotiations continued into the autumn months, with Zhou Enlai in the lead for the CCP. By early December, both parties had agreed that the Red Army would come under the central military command and that the most radical Communist policies, like land confiscation, would be halted. The agreement was made verbally, but not in writing by December 12.

However, Zhang Xueling had not been involved in the secret talks that had laid the foundation for an alliance between the Nationalists and the Communists. Consequently, Zhang planned to plot a coup in "great secrecy". The Communists had previously taken advantage of dissent in the Nationalist camp. They made repeated exhortations for Chinese unity against Japan. In February 1936, they announced that they were sending a detachment through Shanxi to fight the Japanese in Rehe and Hubei. Letting the Red Army through would have broken the encirclement, so Yan Xishan stopped them by force. Although defeated militarily, the Red Army convinced the Shanxi peasantry of their patriotism and gained 8,000 new recruits on their retreat. Zhang Xueliang was impressed, and began to see them as potential allies rather than foes. When Mao had announced on March 14 that the Communists were willing to conclude a truce, Zhang covertly agreed. He proposed to Chiang Kai-shek that he reverse the Nationalist policy of prioritizing the purge of Communists, and instead focusing on military preparation against Japanese aggression. By June 1936, another secret agreement between Zhang and the CCP had been successfully settled. It was this complex web of secret dealings and double-crossings that would culminate on December 12.

Events

Chiang's Arrest

Bullet hole made while Northeastern Army soldiers stormed the Huaqing Pool complex

In November 1936, Zhang asked Chiang to come to Xi'an to raise the morale of troops unwilling to fight the Communists.

After Chiang agreed, Zhang informed Mao Zedong, who called the plan "a masterpiece". At Xi'an, Chiang stayed in his resort headquarters at the Huaqing Pool complex. On 12 December 1936, bodyguards of Zhang and Yang stormed the cabin where Chiang was sleeping. Chiang was able to escape but suffered an injury in the process. He was eventually detained by Zhang's troops in the morning.

Immediate Developments and Reactions Across China

The Northeastern Army sent a telegram to Nanjing explaining to the Chinese public why they had arrested Chiang and the eight demands they had for his release. These included an immediate end to civil war against the CCP, expulsion of pro-Japanese factions from the Nationalist government, and the adoption of an active anti-Japanese military stance. They attempted to broadcast these demands publicly, but Nationalist censorship prevented their publication outside the Communist-held areas.

In the 1930s, Wang Jingwei was a prominent leader in the Kuomintang. He was both a political partner and rival of Chiang, as well as his potential successor.

News of the abduction spawned a wave of "extraordinarily widespread" popular support for Chiang Kai-Shek, according to an American diplomat. This was paralleled by a surge of reproach directed at Zhang Xueliang by both the Nationalist government and the wider Chinese public, who viewed Zhang's actions as treachery.

The Military Affairs Commission, led by He Yingqin, threatened to launch a direct attack on Xi'an to rescue Chiang, and immediately sent a regiment to capture Tongguan. American journalist James Bertram recalled feeling how another civil war was about to break out, and personally observed fleets of government aircraft flying low over the roofs of Xi'an. H.H. Kung declared over radio that there would be "no dealings with armed rebellion, no truce with the 'Communist bandits.'"

Chiang's wife Soong Mei-ling, fearing for her husband's life and a potential coup from He Yingqin, vetoed the idea, and instead traveled to Xi'an to stay with Chiang during his captivity. Kong Xiangxi, along with Soong, was strongly in favor of negotiating a settlement to ensure the safety of Chiang.

Of key importance was the reaction of China's leaders. Many major figures, including warlord opponents of Chiang like Yan Xishan, were wary of a potential power vacuum that would follow Chiang's death or deposition. Chiang's ability to control the various factions of the Nationalist government was unique to his leadership and survival. Moreover, Chiang was implacably anti-Japanese, unlike his potential successor Wang Jingwei. This was a factor not lost on a key stakeholder in China, Joseph Stalin. News of Chiang's capture delighted Communist leader Mao Zedong, who wished Chiang executed immediately. Similarly, a faction of the Northeastern Army led by Yang Hucheng and the radical young officers of the "Anti-Japanese Comrade Society" wanted to execute Chiang. However, when Mao requested instructions from Moscow, he was met by a strong rebuke from Stalin, who found Chiang's imprisonment a serious source of alarm.

Stalin's intervention

Joseph Stalin in 1936, whose intervention likely saved Chiang's life

One key actor in the crisis was Joseph Stalin. Following the Chiang's abduction, a Chinese contact had explained to Stalin that without Chiang, "China would be without a leader to fight the Japanese and this would not benefit the Soviet Union."

Stalin feared that in Chiang's absence, a figure like Wang Jingwei, perhaps assisted by He Yingqin, would take control of the Nationalists and create a pro-Japanese Chinese regime, placing the Soviet Union in extreme danger of a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union. His anxieties were confirmed when Chiang's rival Wang Jingwei met with Adolf Hitler to discuss the prospect of China enlisting in the anti-Communist Axis in exchange for greater German aid to China.

Fearing a possible two-front war with both the Nazis and the Japanese, and potentially a pro-Japanese China in support, Stalin ordered that the CCP settle its disagreement with Chiang and release him alive. To this end, Zhou Enlai instructed Zhang Xueliang not to harm Chiang in any capacity.

Negotiations

In captivity, Zhang then offered Chiang a choice between death or a war with Japan in alliance with the Communists.

At first, Chiang refused to formally agree to any demands while held a captive, and appeared fully prepared to accept death rather than submission. This changed when Zhou Enlai, who Chiang had been in secret negotiations with since the summer of that year, arrived in Xi'an on December 16 to represent the CCP.

The negotiating room where Chiang Kai-shek met with Zhou Enlai

On December 24, Chiang received Zhou for a meeting, the first time the two had seen each other since Zhou had left Whampoa Military Academy over ten years earlier. Zhou began the conversation by saying: "In the ten years since we have met, you seem to have aged very little." Chiang nodded and said: "Enlai, you were my subordinate. You should do what I say." Zhou replied that if Chiang would halt the civil war and resist the Japanese instead, the Red Army would willingly accept Chiang's command.

In their meeting, Chiang and Zhou finalized the secret agreements that had been in tentative form since summer of 1936, where the Communists would accept orders from Chiang in a national unity coalition, and Chiang would allow the Communists to field their own independent army. To the public, it seemed as if Chiang had been compelled into an alliance against the Japanese, but in reality the terms of the arrangement were almost identical to those agreed upon in secret before the kidnapping took place.

At the end of the meeting, Chiang invited Zhou to Nanjing for further talks. Chiang was released on 26 December and returned to Nanjing with Zhang Xueliang.

Aftermath

Lin Sen receives Chiang Kai-shek at the Nanjing Airport after the Xi'an Incident.

When Chiang was released, public opinion was decisively in his favor. His arrival to Nanjing was greeted by cheering crowds of over 400,000 people. Edgar Snow declared that Chiang had returned with a national standing "higher than that of any leader in modern Chinese history."

Historian Jay Taylor writes how Xi'an turned Chiang from a "popular leader" into a "national hero." American ambassador Nelson T. Johnson wrote how "Whereas the outstanding developments during the first half of 1936 increased the precariousness of China's position, the significant events of the second half, in their larger aspects, have had the opposite effect." He observed that the Xi'an crisis "fostered another spontaneous outburst of nationalism throughout the country and caused universal rejoicing when the Generalissimo was released on Christmas Day."

The Second United Front

After Chiang returned to Nanjing, he announced a cease fire in the civil war. However, he also repudiated any promises that he had made in Xi'an. He had Zhang imprisoned and charged with treason. Chiang then sent 37 army divisions north to surround the Northeastern Army and force them to stand down. The army was deeply divided on the appropriate response. Yang Hucheng and the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society wanted to stand and fight if the KMT army attacked, and refuse to negotiate until Zhang was released. The Communist representatives strongly disagreed and cautioned that civil war would, in the words of Zhou Enlai, "make China into another Spain".

A Communist army order instructing its troops to accept orders from the Nationalist government

Further negotiations between the CCP and Nanjing continued. However, when a conference of Northeastern officers in January 1937 overwhelmingly resolved not to surrender peacefully, the CCP reluctantly decided that they could not abandon their allies and pledged to fight alongside them if the KMT attacked. The situation was again reversed when the five most senior Northeastern generals met separately and decided to surrender. The radical officers were enraged and assassinated one of the generals on 2 February, but this only turned the majority of the soldiers against the plan to stand and fight. The Northeastern Army peacefully surrendered to advancing KMT forces and was divided into new units, which were sent to Hebei, Hunan, and Anhui. Yang Hucheng, however, was arrested and eventually executed, while the leaders of the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society defected to the Red Army. Zhang was kept under house arrest for over 50 years before emigrating to Hawaii in 1993.

The rapprochement between the Communists and Nationalists outraged the Japanese, and eventually helped lead to the Second Sino-Japanese War. This in turn hastened the two Chinese factions into formalizing their alliance as the Second United Front.

The Xi'an Incident was a turning point for the CCP. Chiang's leadership over political and military affairs in China was affirmed, while the CCP was able to expand its own strength under the new united front, which played a role in the Chinese Communist Revolution.

Legacy

In present day China, Zhang Xueliang is portrayed as a patriot who was shocked by Chiang's unwillingness to face the looming threat of Japan, rather focusing on fighting his fellow Chinese. In this narrative, Zhang kidnapped Chiang to force a change in attitude. Historian Rana Mitter, however, attributes Zhang's agenda to a more straightforward motivation: that Chiang was likely to deprive him of military command. To this end, Zhang's decision would have been influenced more out of self-preservation over patriotism.

See also

• Outline of the Chinese Civil War

References

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